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Administration of Estates
Administration of Estates; actions against bond sureties-statute of
limitations
Probate Code §§ 2333, 7250, 8488 (amended).
AB 516 (Statham); 1993 STAT. Ch. 794
Existing law requires that before letters' can be issued, a guardian,2
conservator,3 or personal representative4 must file a bond with the clerk
of the court.' Existing law further provides that an action brought against
the sureties6 on a bond for a guardian or conservator must be initiated
within four years from the date of discharge or removal or four years from
1. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 52(b) (West 1991) (defining letters in relation to a guardian or conservator
as letters of guardianship or conservatorship); id. § 2310 (West 1991) (providing that the letters issued by the
clerk of the court are evidence of the appointment of guardianship or conservatorship); id. § 2594 (West 1991)
(stating the letters of guardianship or conservatorship shall state the powers granted and restrictions of authority).
2. See id. §§ 2350-2359 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993) (describing the powers and duties of a guardian);
id. 88 2401-2591 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993) (describing the powers and duties of a guardian of the estate); id.
§ 1514 (Vest Supp. 1993) (permitting the court to appoint a guardian over a person, estate, or both if it appears
necessary or convenient).
3. See id. § 2350(a) (West 1991) (defining conservator); id. §§ 2351-2359 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993)
(describing the powers and duties of a conservator); id. §§ 2401-2591 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993) (describing
the powers and duties of a conservator of the estate); id. § 1800.3 (Vest 1991) (permitting a court, for either
an adult or a married minor child, to appoint a conservator of the person, estate, or both person and estate); id.
§ 1801 (Vest 1991) (permitting a conservator to be appointed for a person who is substantially unable to manage
his or her financial resources or care for his or her personal needs).
4. See id. § 58(a) (West 1991) (defining personal representative as executor, administrator, or anyone
who performs substantially the same function); id. § 11750(a) (West 1991) (providing that the personal
representative is responsible for distribution of a decedent's estate).
5. Id. § 2320(a) (West 1991); see id. § 2320(c) (West 1991) (specifying the amount of bond required
to be supplied by an admitted surety insurer); id. § 2321 (\Vest 1991) (allowing the court to waive the bond
requirement for a conservator when nominated by a conservatee with sufficient capacity); id. § 2322 (West 1991)
(dispensing with the bond requirement for persons only appointed guardian or conservator of the person unless
specifically required by the court); id. § 2323(a) (West 1991) (dispensing with the bond requirement for certain
small estates or estates solely for public benefit); id. § 2324 (West 1991) (permitting a person making a
nomination for a guardian to waive the bond requirement); see also In re Chin Mee Ho, 140 Cal. 263, 267, 73
P. 1002, 1004 (1903) (holding that a court's erroneous failure to require a bond of the guardian does not
necessarily invalidate the guardianship proceedings); Murphy v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. 592, 597, 24 P. 310,
311 (1890) (stating that one who is appointed guardian by a deed of trust but fails to provide a bond is not a
legal guardian); cf ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5105 (,Vest 1975) (permitting the court to require a guardian
of a person under a disability to furnish a bond); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.402(1)(WVest Supp. 1993) (requiring
a personal representative to post a bond unless the testator waived the requirement); id. § 744.351(1) (West
Supp. 1993) (requiring every person appointed a guardian of property to file a bond with a surety unless the
testator has waived the requirement); N.Y. SURR. CT. PRoc. AcT Law § 806 (McKinney Supp. 1993) (requiring
an executor who is required to hold, manage, or invest property for another's benefit to execute and file a bond).
6. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 2787 (Vest 1993) (abolishing any distinction between sureties and guarantors
and defining both as one who promises to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another); see also id.
§ 1624(b) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring suretyship contracts to be in writing).
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the date of the final order surcharging the guardian or conservator,
whichever is later.7 Existing law also requires that an action against the
surety of a personal representative be brought within four years after the
discharge of the personal representative.8 Chapter 794, in any case,
establishes an additional requirement that an action against a surety be
commenced within six years from the date the judgment or order becomes
final.9
Existing law provides that a final or interim order settling the account
of the personal representative of a decedent's estate releases the personal
representative and any sureties from all claims. 10 Chapter 794 provides
an exception if the order is obtained by fraud, conspiracy,
misrepresentation, or omission of a material fact."
CJK
7. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2333(b) (amended by Chapter 794); see Reriew of Selected 1990 California
Legislation, 22 PAC. L.J. 344, 345 (1991) (discussing when actions must be commenced against sureties of
guardians or conservators); see also Bums v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 62 Cal. App. 2d 962, 965, 146
P.2d 24, 25 (1944) (providing a tolling of the statute of limitations under the prior statute which stated that the
limitations period begins to run in favor of the surety upon discharge or removal in order to prevent the injustice
of an action being barred before it has even accrued).
8. CAL. PROB. CODE § 8488 (amended by Chapter 794); see Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co. v. Old
Republic Surety Co., 561 N.E.2d 1208, 1211 (111. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that a surety on an administrator's
bond is responsible for all funds coming into the hands of the administrator under the color of his office or
authority, and not just for assets that constitute part of the estate), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 837 (1990).
9. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2333(c) (amended by Chapter 794); id. § 8488(c) (amended by Chapter 794);
cf MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5807(1) (West 1987) (requiring an action against a surety on a bond of an
executor, administrator, or guardian to be commenced within four years of discharge); In re Lee Estate, 484
N.W.2d 411,414 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (holding the action barred by the limitations period which required an
action against a surety on an administrator's bond to be commenced within four years from the date of
discharge); In re Guardianship of Hampton, 374 N.W.2d 264, 268 (Minn. 1985) (holding that the surety could
not raise technical noncompliance with statutory requirements to avoid liability on a guardianship bond); cf
Maloney v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 1, 12, 123 P.2d 449, 455 (1942) (holding that the
limitations period governing the time within which to bring an action upon a written instrument would apply
when the guardian dies before he could be removed or discharged by court order).
10. CAL. PROB. CODE § 7250(a) (amended by Chapter 794).
11. Id. § 7250(c) (amended by Chapter 794); see id. § 2103(b) (West 1991) (providing that a final
judgment or order will not release a surety for a guardian or conservator if the judgment or order was obtained
by fraud, conspiracy, misrepresentation, or omission of material fact); see also I re Conservatorship of Harvey,
3 Cal. 3d 646, 651-52, 477 P.2d 742, 744, 91 Cal. Rptr. 510, 512 (1970) (holding that a final order in a
conservatorship proceeding obtained by fraud, conspiracy, or misrepresentation of a material fact does not release
the conservator from liability); Bank of America v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 705, 714, 226 Cal. Rptr.
685, 690 (1986) (providing that fraud in obtaining the order does not have res judicata effect); Lazzarone v.
Bank of America, 181 Cal. App. 3d 581, 595, 226 Cal. Rptr. 855, 863 (1986) (stating that where a final order
was obtained through extrinsic fraud, it may be set aside by a suit in equity).
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Administration of Estates; decedents' estates
Civil Code § 2883 (amended); Code of Civil Procedure § 996.470
(amended); Probate Code §§ 5023, 10811 (amended).
AB 908 (Horcher); 1993 STAT. Ch. 527
Existing law authorizes agreements creating liens' upon property not
yet acquired by the party agreeing to give the lien.2 In such a case, a lien
attaches when the property is acquired by that party, to the extent of the
interest acquired. Chapter 527 specifies that an agreement by a
beneficiary4 of a decedent's estate5 to give a lien on undistributed real
property' in the estate creates no lien until the property is distributed to
that beneficiary.7 Chapter 527 also specifies that, when the estate records
8
an order9 confirming a sale'0 of the property, any expectancy of such a
lien in the real property is extinguished."
I. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 2872 (West 1993) (defining a lien as a charge imposed in some mode, other
than by a transfer in trust, upon specific property as security for the performance of an act).
2. Id. § 2883(a) (amended by Chapter 527); see Mason v. Citizens' Nat'l Trust & Savings Bank of Los
Angeles, 71 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1934) (stating that California Civil Code § 2883 is general in nature and
refers to both real and personal property); In re Los Angeles Mfg. Co., 7 F. Supp. 567, 567 (S.D. Cal. 1934)
(holding that a lien may be created upon property not yet in existence); Garter v. Metzdorf Associates, 217 Cal.
App. 2d 812, 821, 32 Cal. Rptr. 113, 119 (1963) (stating that an equitable lien may embrace property not yet
acquired).
3. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2883(a) (amended by Chapter 527).
4. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 24 (West 1991) (defining beneficiary).
5. See id. § 6600 (West 1991) (defining decedent's estate).
6. See id. § 68 (West 1991) (defining real property).
7. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2883(b) (amended by Chapter 527); see CAL. PROB. CODE § 11600 (West 1991)
(providing that the personal representative or an interested person may petition the court for an order for
distribution of the decedent's estate); id. § 11604 (West 1991) (providing that beneficiaries in a decedent's estate
may assign any or all of their interest therein prior to distribution, but the court may refuse to order distribution
in accordance with the assignment under certain circumstances).
8. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 7263 (West 1991) (requiring the personal representative of the estate to
record a certified copy of the order confirming a sale or distribution of real property with the county recorder
where any portion of the real property is located).
9. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1003 (West 1980) (defining order).
10. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 10308 (West 1991) (requiring that all sales of real property be reported to
and be confirmed by the court before title to the property passes to the purchaser); id. § 10313 (West 1991)
(outlining the requirements of the court for making an order confirming the sale of real property).
11. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2883(b) (amended by Chapter 527); see SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS Or AB 908, at 4 (Aug. 23, 1993) (stating that, if the personal representative of the estate decides that
the property should be sold prior to the distribution of the estate, a deed of trust on the future interest becomes
a cloud on the title and may interfere with the property sale and the orderly distribution of the assets of the
estate; thus, the Legislature intended to correct this problem by declaring the deed of trust on the future interest




Under existing law, the aggregate liability of a surety" to all persons
for all breaches of the condition of a bond 13 is limited to the amount of
the bond. 4 Chapter 527 specifies that where a beneficiary 5 makes a
claim for payment on a bond given in an action or proceeding, after the
liability of the principal 16 is established and the surety fails to make
payment, the surety is liable for costs incurred in obtaining a judgment
against the surety, including reasonable attorney's fees 7 and interest' 8
12. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 2787 (Vest 1993) (defining surety as one who promises to answer for the
debt, default, or miscarriage of another, or pledges property as security therefor).
13. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 995.140 (West Supp. 1993) (defining bond).
14. Id. § 996.470(a) (amended by Chapter 527); see id. (providing that the liability of the principal is not
limited to the amount of the bond); id. (specifying that the provisions of California Civil Procedure Code §
996.470 is controlling law notwithstanding any other statute, except Civil Procedure Code § 996.480); id. §
996.480(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that if the nature and extent of the liability of the principal is
established by final judgment of a court and the time for appeal has expired or the appeal is taken and the
judgment is affirmed, and if the beneficiary makes a claim for payment on a bond in an action or proceeding
and surety fails to make payment, the surety is liable for costs incurred in obtaining a judgment against the
surety, including reasonable attorney's fees and interest on the judgment); Continental Ins. Co. v. Crockett, 177
Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 24-29, 223 Cal. Rptr. 772, 778-81 (1985) (concluding that under California Public
Utilities Code §§ 1074, 3573, and Civil Procedure Code § 996.470(a), which provide the statutory scheme
regulating the aggregate liability of a surety, a surety's liability on a bond is limited to the face amount of the
bond and the surety is not required to increase the face amount to reflect increases in the amount required by
subsequent general orders promulgated by the Public Utilities Commission); see also CAL. PROB. CODE §
8480(a)-(b) (West 1991) (requiring a personal representative to give a bond approved by the court for the benefit
of interested persons to ensure the personal representative's faithful execution of the duties of the office
according to law). See generally ARTHUR A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP §§ 10.38-10.45 Q. Elder rev.,
5th ed. 195 1) (discussing the use of surety bonds by executors, administrators, and guardians to insure that they
faithfully administer their office according to law and to protect the assets of the estate).
15. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 995.130 (West Supp. 1993) (defining beneficiary as the person for
whose benefit a bond is given).
16. See id. § 995.170 (Vest Supp. 1993) (defining principal as the person who gives a bond).
17. See id. § 1033.5(c)(I)-(5) (Vest Supp. 1993) (providing that an award of attorney's fees must be
reasonably necessary to conduct the litigation and reasonable in amount and that any claim not based upon the
court's established schedule of attorney's fees for actions on a contract must bear the burden of proof); id.
(explaining that attorney's fees may be fixed as follows: (1) Upon a noticed matter; (2) at the time a statement
of decision is rendered: (3) upon application supported by affidavit made concurrently with a claim for other
costs; or (4) upon entry of default judgment); Bussey v. Affleck, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1162, 1166, 275 Cal. Rptr.
646, 648 (1990) (holding that where a contract provides for payment of costs and attorney's fees, the court may
allow disbursements of counsel as attorney fees tinder California Civil Code § 1033.5(a)(10), if they represent
expenses ordinarily billed to a client and are not included in the overhead component of counsel's hourly rate);
see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1032(b) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that a prevailing party is entitled to
recover costs in any action or proceeding, except as expressly provided by statute); id. § 1033.5(a)(10)(A)-(B)
(Vest Supp. 1993) (specifying that attorney's fees are recoverable as costs, under California Civil Procedure
Code § 1032, when authorized by either contract or statute).
18. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3287-3291 (West 1970 & Supp. 1993); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 685.010-
.110 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993) (outlining the limits and procedures for obtaining interest on a judgment).
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on the judgment, even if the total liability of the surety exceeds the amount
of the bond. 9
Existing law limits the compensation of an attorney for the personal
representative20 of a decedent's estate to an amount based on the size of
the estate for ordinary services, 2' but allows the court to authorize
additional compensation that is just and reasonable2 2 for extraordinary
services.23 Chapter 527 allows the attorney for the personal representative
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 996.470, 996.480 (West Supp. 1993 & amended by Chapter 527); see
Harris v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 6 Cal. App. 4th 1061, 1067, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234,238 (1992) (holding that
the surety cannot be held liable in excess of the amount of its bond for interest as an element of damages caused
by the principal's conduct, but liability may be imposed for court costs as a result of the surety's own conduct
in unsuccessfully litigating the complaint rather than negotiating a settlement); id. (specifying that the surety is
liable for its own default in failing to pay following the filing the complaint).
20. See CAt.. PROB. CODE § 58(a) (West 1991) (defining personal representative).
21. See id. § 10810 (West 1991) (establishing the compensation for ordinary services of the attorney for
the personal representative).
22. See In re Neff's Estate, 56 Cal. App. 2d 728, 731-32, 133 P.2d 413, 415 (1943) (stating that it is the
duty of the court to determine whether services denominated extraordinary were necessarily required in the
administration of the estate, and, if so, to decide what would be a just and reasonable allowance); id. (stating
that in making its order fixing such fees, the court has great discretion and its judgment will not be interfered
with on appeal, except in the face of a plain abuse of discretion).
23. CAL. PROB. CODE § 10810 (West 1991); id. § 10811(a) (amended by Chapter 527); see id. §
10811(b) (West 1991) (including services by a paralegal performing the extraordinary services under the
direction and supervision of an attorney as among the extraordinary services by the attorney for which
extraordinary compensation is allowed); Estate of Beach, 15 Cal. 3d 623, 645, 542 P.2d 994, 1008, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 570, 584 (1975) (holding that the extraordinary compensation awarded the executor and his attorneys
following the successftl defense of a proceeding contesting the executor's account, in which the contestants
sought to surcharge the executor, had to be upheld unless they appeared so clearly out of proportion to the
services rendered as to be an abuse of discretion); id. (stating that, in fixing the amount of extraordinary
compensation for the executor and his attorneys, the court could properly consider, not only the time spent, but
also such factors as the value of the estate, the skills exercised, the amount in dispute, and the results obtained);
In re Walker's Estate, 221 Cal. App. 2d 792, 795, 34 Cal. Rptr. 832, 834 (1963) (stating that the Probate Code
makes discretionary an allowance of fees for extraordinary services rendered by executors, administrators, and
their attorneys); id. (explaining that in making an allowance for such services, or in disallowing a claim therefor,
the probate court may take into consideration all matters relating to the administration of a particular estate, such
as: (1) The value of the estate; (2) the kind and character of the assets; (3) the effort involved in the care and
preservation of the estate property; (4) other factors which bear upon the labor and effort of the executor,
administrator, and aitorney in the routine administration of the estate; and (5) the ordinary fees to which such
persons are entitled); see also hI re Turino's Estate, 8 Cal. App. 3d 642, 649, 87 Cal. Rptr. 581, 586 (1970)
(holding that, in awarding extraordinary fees to the attorney for the executor as the court may find just and
reasonable, it is clear the probate judge has wide discretion, and it is not the province of the court of appeal to
substitute its opinion for that of the lower court unless it is clearly demonstrated on the facts that the lower
court's determination was wholly unreasonable); In re Walker's Estate, 221 Cal. App. 2d at 795-96, 34 Cal.
Rptr. at 834 (stating that the purpose behind the Legislature's enacting of this provision was to allow extra
compensation for executors, administrators, and attorneys, but only where extraordinary services are not
adequately compensated); In re Lundell's Estate, 95 Cal. App. 2d 352, 356, 212 P.2d 914, 916 (1949) (holding
that an extraordinary fee of $12,000, awarded by the probate court to the executor's attorney for 100 hours of
services in connection with negotiating, without litigation, the settlement of $100,000 of disputed claims on the
testator's $150,000 worth of life insurance policies, was so great as to shock the conscience and required reversal
of the order allowing it as an abuse of discretion, in the absence of a more definite showing of the extraordinary
nature of the attorney's services).
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to provide extraordinary services on a contingent fee?4 basis if approved
by the court as just and reasonable, as an advantage of the estate, and in
the best interests of persons interested in the estate.25
FSG
Administration of Estates; document preservation-attorney liability
Government Code §§ 26810, 26827.6, 26827.7 (new); Probate
Code §§ 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715,
716, 720, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735 (new); § 2586 (amended).
AB 209 (Horcher); 1993 STAT. Ch. 519
Under existing law, an attorney who holds a will for safekeeping does
so in a fiduciary capacity' and is required to deliver the will to the clerk
of the superior court within thirty days after obtaining knowledge of the
24. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6147 (West Supp. 1993) (outlining the requirements for entering into
a contingency fee agreement and the procedures that the attorney must follow); CAL. PROB. CODE § 1220 (West
1991) (describing how, where, and to whom notice is to be given regarding the hearing to approve the
contingency fee agreement); id. § 10812(c) (West 1991) (describing the persons to be notified of the hearing
to approve the contingency fee agreement).
25. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1081 1(c) (amended by Chapter 527); see id. (requiring also that the contingency
fee agreement comply with Business & Professions Code § 6147 and that the agreement be approved by the
court following a noticed hearing as provided by Probate Code § 10812); see also id. § 48 (West 1991) (defining
interested person); hI re Estate of Kerr, 63 Cal. 2d 875, 878, 409 P.2d 931, 933, 48 Cal. Rptr. 707, 709 (1966)
(stating that a contingent fee contract for services rendered as attorney for an executor is invalid). But see In re
Estate of Hasting's, 108 Cal. App. 2d 713, 716, 239 P.2d 684, 686 (1952) (holding that an award of attorney's
fees under the Probate Code must be in a fixed amount, and is void if granted in the form of an indefinite or
uncertain amount); In re Rowe's Estate, 66 Cal. App. 2d 594, 603-05, 152 P.2d 765, 769-71 (1944) (holding
that an order fixing the attorney's fee for extraordinary services to the executrix at 40% of the decedent's estate,
at a time when the value of the estate was uncertain and when it was reasonable to assume that the estate would
not close for a considerable period of time, was void); In re McDonald's Estate, 37 Cal. App. 2d 521, 525, 99
P.2d 1115, 1117 (1940) (holding that the Probate Code allowance for attorney's fees to be made by the court
should be for a definite, fixed, and certain cash allowance, and not for a percentage of the value of assets
recovered or to be recovered for the estate).
1. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (defining fiduciary duty as: "Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts
of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the disintegrating erosion of particular
exceptions.").
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death of the testator.2 Chapter 519 establishes the duties and liabilities of
an attorney regarding specified estate planning documents 3 and provides
that an attorney must use ordinary care for the preservation of such
documents whether or not consideration is given for their safekeeping.4
2. CAL. PROB. CODE § 8200 (West 1991); see id. § 8200(a)(2) (West 1991) (requiring the custodian of
a will to mail a copy of the will to the executor named in the will, if the person's whereabouts are known, or
if the executor's location is unknown, to a beneficiary); Mastick v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. 347, 350, 29 P. 869,
870 (1892) (holding that any person competent to make a will has the fight to select a custodian for the will,
and subsequent incompetency does not entitle the guardian to possession of the will); In re Arbuckle's Estate,
98 Cal. App. 2d 562, 569, 220 P.2d 950, 955 (1950) (stating that where the decedent's trusted agent accepted
custody of a will, he accepted the responsibilities that accompany custodianship of safely preserving the will for
the decedent until the decedent's death and then delivering the will to the proper court for probate); Ahlborn v.
Peters, 37 Cal. App. 2d 698, 707, 100 P.2d 542, 547 (1940) (stating that two elements are indispensable in an
action against the custodian of a will: (1) The author of the will must have confided possession of the instrument
to the custodian; and (2) the custodian must have failed to present the instrument within 30 days to the proper
authority); id. (specifying that mere possession of documents that a party alleges constitutes the decedent's will
does not make the possessor of such documents a custodian); Snyder v. Security-First Nat'l Bank of Los
Angeles, 31 Cal. App. 2d 660, 664, 88 P.2d 760, 762 (1939) (stating that the limitations period against a
custodian for failure to timely deliver a will to the executor or clerk of the court is three years unless it is
predicated upon fraud, in which case the period is tolled until the aggrieved party discovers facts constituting
the fraud); id. at 665-66, 88 P.2d at 763 (stating that purpose of the statute requiring the delivery of a will to
the executor and clerk of the court within 30 days of the testator's death is to exact the discovery of wills, and
in no way to encourage concealment); id. (holding that a custodian is required to comply with the 30 day
delivery requirement even if he or she is also named as the executor). See generally Ronald E. Mallen and
Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice, §§ 26.1-27.0 (1992) (discussing attorney malpractice exposure in the
substantive area of wills, trusts, and estates); Joan Teshima, Annotation, Attorney's Liability, to One Other Than
hnmediate Client, for Negligence in Connection with Legal Duties; 61 A.L.R. 4th 615, 661-72 (1992) (discussing
the third-party beneficiary analysis to hold an attorney liable for professional negligence to a party who was not
his client); Joan Teshima, Annotation, What Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to Render Attorney Liable to
Person Other than hmnediate Client, 61 A.L.R. 4th 464, 478-79 (1992) (discussing the general elements of
negligence in an action against an attorney by a party other than the immediate client); Sonja A. Soehnel,
Annotation, Liabilit, in Damages for Interference with Expected Inheritance or Gift, 22 A.L.R. 4th 1229, 1243-
47, (1983) (discussing potential liability of third parties for suppression, spoliation, destruction, or loss of a will);
Joseph T. Bockrath, Annotation, Attorney's Negligence in Connection with Estate, Will, or Succession Matters,
55 A.L.R. 3d 977, 978-79 (1974 & Supp. 1993) (describing the scope of the annotation as those cases in which
an attorney was held liable to his immediate client in the performance of duties other than in actual conduct of
litigation).
3. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 704(a)-(d) (enacted by Chapter 519) (defining document as any of the
following: (1) A signed will, declaration of trust, trust amendment, or other document modifying a will or trust;
(2) a signed original power of attorney; (3) a signed original nomination of conservator; or (4) any other signed
original document which the attorney and depositor agree in writing to make subject to the provisions).
4. Id. § 710 (enacted by Chapter 519); see id. (requiring an attorney to hold the documents in a safe,
vault, safe deposit box, or other secure place that will reasonably protect against loss or destruction); id. § 714(a)
(enacted by Chapter 519) (providing that an attorney may charge the depositor for compensation and expenses
related to the safekeeping of a document if provided for in a signed written agreement); id. § 714(b) (enacted
by Chapter 519) (specifying that in no event will a lien arise against documents deposited with an attorney for
safekeeping, even if provided for in an agreement); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2513 (1992) (providing that
any testator or attorney may deposit with the Register of Wills an original will for safekeeping); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-2-535 (1993) (authorizing either a testator or a testator's agent to deposit a will with the court for
safekeeping); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. AcT LAW § 2507 (McKinney Supp. 1993) (providing that a domiciliary
may deposit a will for safekeeping with the court); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 853.09(1) (West 1991) (providing that
a testator may deposit a will with the probate court of the county in which he or she resides). But see CAL. CIv.
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Chapter 519 requires an attorney to give notice to a depositor' if a
document is lost or destroyed and limits the attorney's liability for lost or
destroyed documents under specified conditions. 6  Chapter 519 also
contains provisions regarding the termination of a deposit.7 Chapter 519
provides that a retired attorney may terminate a deposit by transferring
documents to the clerk of the superior court of the county of the
depositor's last known address. 8 Chapter 519 specifies that an attorney
who has terminated a deposit is only required to use slight care9 for the
CODE § 1856 (west 1985) (providing that a depositary for hire has a lien for storage charges).
5. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 703 (enacted by Chapter 519) (defining depositor as a natural person who
deposits documents with an attorney).
6. Id. §§ 711, 712 (enacted by Chapter 519); see id. § 711 (enacted by Chapter 519) (requiring notice
of loss or destruction to be given by either: (1) Mailing to the depositor's last known address; or (2) by a method
most likely to give actual notice); id. § 712 (enacted by Chapter 519) (providing that an attorney is not liable
for the loss or destruction under the following conditions: (1) The depositor has actual notice of the loss or
destruction; (2) the depositor has a reasonable opportunity to replace the document; and (3) the attorney offers
to replace the document or prepare a substantially similar one without charge); see also id. § 713 (enacted by
Chapter 519) (specifying that the acceptance of a document for safekeeping by an attorney does not impose any
duty to inquire into its content or validity, nor to provide any continuing legal services to the depositor or any
beneficiary).
7. Id. §§ 720-734 (enacted by Chapter 519); see id. § 702 (enacted by Chapter 519) (defining deposit
as the delivery of a document to, or the retention of a document by, an attorney for safekeeping); id. § 720
(enacted by Chapter 519) (specifying that a depositor may terminate a deposit on demand); id. § 731 (enacted
by Chapter 519) (stating that an attorney may terminate a deposit by: (1) Personally delivering the document
to the depositor; (2) mailing the document to the depositor's last known address via certified mail with return
receipt requested, and receiving a signed receipt; or (3) a method agreed upon by the attorney and depositor),
id. 732(a) (enacted by Chapter 519) (specifying that an attorney may terminate a deposit if a depositor fails to
respond within 90 days to a notice mailed to the depositor's last known address); id. § 732(b)-(c) (enacted by
Chapter 519) (providing that a deposit may be terminated by transferring the document to another attorney; or,
if the attorney is deceased or lacks legal capacity, by transferring the document to the clerk of the superior court
of the county of the depositor's last known address); id. § 734 (enacted by Chapter 519) (specifying that if the
attorney has actual notice that the depositor has died the deposit may be terminated: (1) by delivery of the
document to the depositor's personal representative; (2) pursuant to California Probate Code § 8200, if the
attorney does not have actual notice that a personal representative has been appointed and the document is a will;
or (3) by delivery to the depositor's personal representative or to the trustee if the document is a trust).
8. Id. § 732(c) (enacted by Chapter 519); see SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS, CoMMirrEE ANALYSIS OF AB
209, at 3 (Aug. 25, 1993) (stating that Chapter 519 was the product of the California Law Review Commission
which studied the issue of the care and responsibility of estate planning documents deposited with an attorney
for safekeeping); Michael Cronk, Attorney Inherits the Wills and is Looking for the Ways, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEvs, Dec. 28, 1990, at 7B (describing the unsuccessful plight of an attorney who, before he could retire, was
struggling to reunite 250 original wills that he had inherited from another attorney who had died several years
earlier); Michael Cronk, 250 Wills in Search of Authors, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec, 26, 1990, at Extra
Supp. 2 pg. 1 (demonstrating how the attorney who was struggling to reunite the 250 original wills with the
testators had to resort to the news media for help).
9. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 1846 (West 1985) (providing that a gratuitous depository need only use slight
care for the preservation of a thing deposited); Kastel v. Stieber, 215 Cal. 37,49, 8 P.2d 474, 479 (1932) (stating
that the failure to exercise slight care is gross negligence); see also Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699,
708, 484 P.2d 84, 90, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 418 (1971) (stating that the police did not breach their duty of slight
care by failing to roll up the windows and lock the doors of a vehicle they had taken into custody); People v.
Costa, 40 Cal. 2d 160, 166, 252 P.2d 1, 5 (1953) (defining gross negligence as the exercise of so slight a degree
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preservation of a document if the attorney has obtained a written
acknowledgement"0 from the depositor, mailed a notice to the depositor
to reclaim the document, and the depositor has failed to reclaim the
document within ninety days."
Existing law provides that a court may order the estate plan of a
conservatee 2 to be produced for examination by the court.13 Chapter
519 provides that, for good cause, the court may order the estate plan of
a conservatee to be transferred to a court-designated custodian for
safekeeping. 14
CJK
of care as to justify a belief that one acted with an indifference to the consequences of one's actions); Stotts v.
Blickle, 220 Cal. 225, 227, 30 P.2d 392, 393 (1934) (holding that the defendant's failure to repair his car after
he noticed it was not steering properly coupled with a finding that he dozed off while driving make out a
sufficient case of failure to exercise slight care, or gross negligence); Higgins v. Security Trust and Sav. Bank,
203 Cal. 398, 403, 264 P. 744, 746 (1928) (holding that a vendor of real property had exercised slight care by
making a good faith inquiry of an abstract and title company); 63 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 662, 672-73 (1980)
(discussing gross negligence and its relation to the exercise of good faith).
10. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 715 (enacted by Chapter 519) (providing a form, describing the attorney's
and depositor's rights and duties, which an attorney may use to give written notice to or obtain a written
acknowledgement from a depositor).
11. Id. § 716 (enacted by Chapter 519); see also id. § 733 (enacted by Chapter 519) (requiring an
attorney to give notice to the State Bar of California containing specified information if a document is transferred
because a depositor has failed to'reclaim it within 90 days after the mailing, the document has been transferred
to another attorney, or the attorney is deceased, lacks legal capacity, or is no longer an active member of the
State Bar).
12. See id. § 2586(a) (amended by Chapter 519) (defining estate plan of the conservatee as including a
will, trust, power of appointment, or joint ownership arrangement which transfers interests at the conservatee's
death).
13. Id. § 2586(b) (amended by Chapter 519).
14. Id. § 2586(d) (amended by Chapter 519).
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Administration of Estates; fiduciaries: self-dealing-use of estate funds
Business and Professions Code § 6103.6 (new); Probate Code §§
2645, 15687, 21350, 21355 (new); §§ 2101, 2583, 10804, 17200
(amended).
AB 21 (Umberg and Morrow); 1993 STAT. Ch. 293
Existing law provides that the relationship between a ward' and a
guardian,2 and a conservatee and a conservator,3 is a fiduciary
relationship.4 Under Chapter 293, this relationship is regulated specifically
by the law of trusts.5
Existing law does not explicitly prohibit an attorney serving as a
trustee, 6 guardian, or conservator from performing additional legal services
for the estate or trust or from receiving additional fees for those services,
nor does it require such attorney to procure approval to receive dual
compensation for legal services. Chapter 293 allows an attorney or the
attorney's law firm to be compensated for additional legal services by an
estate' or trust for which the attorney also acts as guardian, conservator,
I. See 4 CAL. WORDS & PHRASES 542 (Bancroft-Whitney 1960) (defining ward).
2. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2400(b) (West 1991) (defining guardian).
3. See id. § 2400(a) (West 1991) (defining conservator).
4. Id. § 2101 (amended by Chapter 293).
5. Id. § 2101 (amended by Chapter 293); see id. (providing for those exceptions as specified in division
four of the California Probate Code); see id. § 82 (West 1991) (defining trusts).
6. See id. § 84 (fVest 1991) (defining trustee).
7. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 21, at 2 (Feb. 4,
1993); see IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-10-13 (West 1979) (allowing dual compensation for legal fees and fees for
acting as a personal representative); In re Estate of Hackett, 366 N.E.2d 1103, 1106 (111. App. 1977) (ruling that
an attorney-representative who performs legal work for an estate is entitled to reasonable compensation for all
services rendered, legal and nonlegal). But see CAL. PROB. CODE § 10804 (amended by Chapter 293)
(prohibiting dual compensation by a personal representative unless explicitly authorized in the decedent's will);
h re Parker's Estate, 200 Cal. 132, 135, 251 P. 907, 909 (1926) (stating that if an executor, administrator, or
testamentary trustee is an attorney and opts to serve as an attorney in the execution of the legal services relating
to the administration of the estate, that person will generally not be entitled to additional compensation for that
person's professional services unless there are statutory provisions providing therefor); Estate of Downing, 134
Cal. App. 3d 256, 269, 184 Cal. Rptr. 511, 524 (1982) (ruling that an attorney acting as an executor may not
collect attorney's fees in lieu of the commission for acting as executor); cf. MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-7-281 (1973)
(stating that where the executor, administrator, or guardian also acts as attorney, the court may permit such a
person reasonable compensation as attorney in lieu of compensation as executor, administrator, or guardian);
WIS. STAT. § 857.05(3) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that an attorney, who serves as a personal representative
and as an attorney for an estate, may receive either the executor's commissions or attorney's fees); WYO. STAT.
§ 2-7-805(c) (1980) (disallowing a fee for the ordinary services of a personal representative to an attorney who
serves both as personal representative and as attorney of the estate).
8. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 353 (West 1991) (defining estate as a trust estate, a decedent's estate, a
guardianship or conservatorship estate, or other property that is the subject of a donative transfer).
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personal representative 9, or trustee only with the advance permission or
approval of the court, or in the case of a trustee, by providing notice"0 to
designated persons" who may object to dual compensation.12  The
provisions in Chapter 293 do not apply to situations in which the
fiduciary t3 is related by blood or marriage 4 or is a cohabitant"5  with
the ward, conservatee or settlor, unless the court specifically finds it in the
best interest of the client. 6
Existing case law does not expressly preclude a person 7 who is
effectual in drafting an instrument 18 which makes a donative transfer for
another from getting a gift thereunder.' 9 Chapter 293, with particular
9. See id. § 58 (West-1991) (defining personal representative).
10. See id. § 15687(d)(2) (enacted by Chapter 293) (permitting 30 days advance written notice to the
appropriate persons).
11. See id. § 17203 (West Supp. 1993) (providing notice for all trustees, all beneficiaries or persons
holding the power to revoke, and the Attorney General, if the matter is related to a charitable trust within the
jurisdiction of the Attorney General).
12. Id. § 2645(a) (enacted by Chapter 293); see id. § 2645(b) (enacted by Chapter 293) (stating that
Chapter 293 precludes any attorney, parent, spouse, child or sibling or spouse of a person who is a guardian or
conservator from receiving legal compensation from the guardianship or conservatorship estate unless the court
approves the additional compensation and finds that it is to the benefit of the ward or conservatee); id. § 10804
(amended by Chapter 293) (providing that a personal representative who is an attorney may not be entitled to
collect attorney's fees unless the court specifically approves the right to compensation); id. § 15687(a),(d)
(enacted by Chapter 293) (stipulating that a trustee may not be entitled to dual compensation unless notice is
given to specified persons).
13. See id. § 39 (West 1991) (defining fiduciary as a personal representative, trustee, guardian,
conservator, or other legal representative).
14. See id. § 21350(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 293) (denoting a relative by blood or marriage as the
person's spouse or predeceased spouse, relatives within the third degree of the person or of the person's spouse,
and of any predeceased spouse of the person, and the spouse of any relative within the third degree of the
person).
15. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 542(c) (West Supp. 1993) (defining a cohabitant as a person who
regularly resides in the household).
16. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2645, 15687 (enacted by Chapter 293); see BLACK'S LAW DICTnONARY 1373
(6th ed. 1990) (defining settlor as the grantor or donor in a settlement, or the creator of a trust).
17. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 56 (West 1991) (defining person as an individual, corporation, government
subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association or other entity).
18. See id. § 45 (West 1991) (defining instrument as a will, trust, deed, or other writing that designates
a beneficiary or makes a donative transfer of property).
19. See Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 58 Cal. 2d 423, 433, 374 P.2d 807, 813, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839, 845
(1962) (allowing an attorney who drafted the transferring instruments to accept substantial inter vivos and
testamentary gifts but cautioned that accepting a gift under questionable circumstances would create a rebuttable
presumption of undue influence); see also Daily v. Wheat, 681 S.W.2d 747,754-55 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (stating
that the existence of a fiduciary relationship does not create a presumption of undue influence). But cf. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-605 (Vernon 1993) (invalidating any will which was prepared by the legal advisor of the
testator when such advisor was the sole or principal beneficiary under the will, unless there is an affirmative
showing that testator was aware of the contents of the will and had independent advice with respect to the will);
Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean, 448 N.E.2d 872, 878 (Ill. 1983) (holding that a presumption of
undue influence arises when an attorney-drafter receives a gift, which can be rebutted only by clear and
convincing evidence provided by the attorney). See generally Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentary Gifts from
Client to the Attorney.Draftsman: From Probate Presumption to Ethical Prohibition, 66 NEB. L. REV. 695
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exceptions, 20 negates a transfer to the person who created or reproduced
such a document or who prompted the instrument to be created or
transcribed.2  Chapter 293 defines such persons as "disqualified
persons, 22 but would provide exceptions for transfers to persons related
by blood or marriage or who cohabitate with the transferor, 3 or where
approval for the transfer is given by the court.24 Chapter 293 further
provides independent review forms for use by the attorney which certify
that the transfer did not result from fraud,25 menace, 26 duress 27 or
undue influence.28 In addition, Chapter 293 specifies that in the situation
where a sole trustee is a "disqualified person, 29 it shall be presumed that
that person will be dismissed by the court as trustee, except as
specified.30 Under Chapter 293, any limitation or waiver of the obligation
(1987) (discussing the evolution of the legal approach to the practice of lawyers naming themselves as
beneficiaries in wills they have drafted for their clients).
20. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(a)-(d) (enacted by Chapter 293) (providing an exception where the
instrument is reviewed by an attorney not related to, or associated with, the drafter or the beneficiary of the
transfer).
21. Id. § 21350(a) (enacted by Chapter 293); see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILITY EC
5-5 (1980) (stating that a lawyer should refrain from suggesting to the client that a gift be made to the attorney
or for the attorney's benefit); cf. In re Schuyler, 434 N.E.2d 1137, 1142 (III. 1982) (negating a transfer under
a will to an attorney-draftsman and imposing disciplinary measures on the attorney). See generally Gerald P.
Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices-Is Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIO
ST. L.J. 57, 60-61 (1984) (discussing the ethical issues when an attorney drafts a will in which the attorney is
a beneficiary).
22. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 293) (defining disqualified person as one
to whom the transfer of property is invalidated under this section, provided the transferor is not related by blood
or marriage to the person creating the instrument).
23. See id. § 81 (West 1991) (defining a transferor as the settlor, grantor, owner, or other person who
executes an instrument).
24. Id. § 2135 1 (a) (enacted by Chapter 293); see id. § 21351 (b),(d) (enacted by Chapter 293) (providing
exceptions to otherwise invalid gifts when the transferor is related by blood or marriage to the creator of the
instrument or when a court determines upon clear and convincing evidence that the transfer was not the product
of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence and the court finds that it is fair to allow the transfer).
25. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1572 (West 1982) (defining actual fraud); id. § 1573 (West 1982) (defining
constructive fraud).
26. See id. § 1570 (West 1982) (defining menace).
27. See id. § 1569 (West 1982) (defining duress).
28. CAL. PROD. CODE § 21351(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 293); see CAL. CIv. CODE § 1575 (West 1982)
(defining undue influence); Lipper v. Weslow, 369 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963) (stating that the test
for undue influence is whether such control was exerted over the mind of the testator as to overcome the
testator's free agency and free will and substitute the will of another so as to make the testator do what the
testator would not otherwise have done without that control).
29. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350(b) (enacted by Chapter 293) (defining disqualified person).
30. Id. § 15642 (amended by Chapter 293); see In re Estate of Weinstock, 351 N.E.2d 647, 649 (N.Y.
1976) (citing the Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-6, which states that a lawyer should not influence
a client to name the lawyer as executor, trustee or probate lawyer in an instrument).
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to perform an accounting is against public policy and is void as to any sole
trustee who is determined to be a "disqualified person. 31
Under Chapter 293, an attorney will be subject to professional
discipline for violations of certain provisions of the Chapter.
32
LAE
Administration of Estates; intestate succession
Probate Code § 6408 (repealed); §§ 6450, 6451, 6452, 6453, 6454,
6455 (new); §§ 1207, 6406 (amended).
AB 1137 (Knight); 1993 STAT. Ch. 529
Existing law provides that an adoption severs the relationship between
the natural parent and an adopted child' for purposes of intestate
succession2 unless certain conditions exist.3 Chapter 529 specifies that a
31. CAL. PROB. CODE § 16062 (amended by Chapter 293).
32. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6103.6 (enacted by Chapter 293); see id. (specifying that a violation of
CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 15687 or 21350 is grounds for discipline).
1. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7601 (West Special Pamphlet 1993) (defining parent and child relationship).
2. See In re Welfer, 110 Cal. App. 2d 262, 264-65, 242 P.2d 655, 656 (1952) (defining intestate
succession as the acquisition of property from one who dies without it being disposed of by will).
3. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6451(a) (enacted by Chapter 529); see CAL. PROB. CODE § 6451(a)(l)-(2)
(enacted by Chapter 529) (re-enacting CAL. PROD. CODE § 6408(b)(I)-(2) and providing that the relationship
of parent and child is not severed if: (1) The natural parent lived with the adopted child or was cohabitating with
the other natural parent at the time of conception but died before the adopted child's birth; and (2) the adoption
was by the spouse of a natural parent or after the death of a natural parent); cf ALA. CODE § 43-8-48(1) (1991)
(providing that an adopted person is a child of the adoptive parent and not the natural parents unless the adoption
is by the spouse of a natural parent); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108(1) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that for
purposes of intestate succession, an adopted person is considered a lineal descendant of the adopting parent and
is not a lineal descendant of the natural parents except when the adoption is by the spouse of a natural parent
or specified close family relative); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-124(2) (1993) (providing that adoption severs the
relationship of parent and child for purposes of intestate succession by, from, or through a natural parent, except
if the adoption is by the spouse of a natural parent); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-110 (1988) (providing that an
adopted child acquires all the rights and other legal consequences as would a natural child of the adoptive
parents); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1(d) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (providing for a distributive
share and the right to succession for adopted children); OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 10, § 60.16 (West Supp. 1993)
(providing that an adopted child can inherit from and through the adoptive parents, and the adoptive parents can
inherit from and through the adoptive child); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 851.51 (West 1991) (providing that an adopted
child is considered a natural child for purposes of intestate succession and the adoption terminates the parent
and child relationship between the child and the natural parents except when a natural parent remarries and the
child is adopted by the stepparent); hI re Jacqueline G., 165 Cal. App. 3d 582, 596, 211 Cal. Rptr. 827, 836
(1985) (stating that when a natural mother relinquishes a child for adoption, all rights and obligations as a
natural parent are extinguished, but the child can still inherit through the mother); Satterfield v. Bonyhady, 446
N.W.2d 214,216 (Neb. 1989) (refusing to draw a distinction between adult and minor adoptees and holding that,
absent specific testamentary directions, an adopted child inherits through adoptive parents the same as natural
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prior adoptive parent is considered a natural parent for purposes of
severance of the relationship of parent and child by a subsequent
adoption.4
Existing law provides that half blood children inherit the same as
whole blood children.5 Chapter 529 establishes that inheritance rights of
half bloods are subject to severance by adoption.6
Existing law permits a parent and child relationship to be established
pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act.7 Existing also law provides that
for purposes of intestate succession by, through, or from a father where
there is no presumption of a father and child relationship, the relationship
may not be established unless either a court order establishing paternity
was obtained during the father's lifetime, or by clear and convincing
evidence establishing that the father openly held the child out as his own.'
children); hi re Estate of Seaman, 583 N.E.2d 294, 296 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that an adopted child could still
inherit from and through both natural parents when the adoptive father was married to the natural mother); Hurt
v. Noble, 817 P.2d 744, 747 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that an adopted child is treated as a lineal descendant
for purposes of inheritance); hi re C.G.F., 483 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Wis. 1992) (stating that a child retains the right
to intestate inheritance from his natural parents' ancestors after their death and subsequent adoption by a
stepparent); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-114(b) (West 1991) (providing that an adopted child is considered a child
of the adopting parent for all purposes of intestate succession and is no longer considered the child of his natural
parents unless the adopting parent is the spouse of a natural parent); id. § 2-114 (West 1977) (specifying that
if a child has the potential to inherit from both a natural and adopting parent, the inheritance is limited to the
larger of the two shares).
4. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6451(c) (enacted by Chapter 529); cf hI re Estate of Orzoff, 452 N.E.2d 82, 84-
85 (111. App. 1983) (stating that an adopted child may inherit from both his natural parents and adoptive parents
and holding that re-adoption prior to the death of prior adopting parents cuts off the child from sharing in the
estate of the prior adopting parents).
5. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6406 (amended by Chapter 529); see Estate of Cocoran, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1099,
1102, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475, 476 (1992) (holding that for purposes of intestate succession, a half brother is treated
as the natural brother of a child born out of wedlock); cf ALA. CODE § 43-8-46 (1991); MtC"t. Com.tp. LAWS
ANN. § 700.109(l) (West 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-117 (1993); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §
4-1.1(b) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (providing that relatives of the half blood inherit the same as if they were
relatives of the whole blood); hi re Heffernan Estate, 371 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Mich. App. 1985) (holding that,
for inheritance purposes, there is no difference between half and whole bloods); Dahood v. Frankovich, 746 P.2d
115, 119 (Mont. 1987) (defining the term half blood to include half blood aunts and uncles); UNIF. PROB. CODE
§ 2-107 (West 1991) (providing that relatives of the half blood inherit the same as those of the whole blood).
6. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6406 (amended by Chapter 529); see supra note 2 (discussing the situation when
the relationship of parent and child will not be severed by an adoption).
7. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6453(a) (enacted by Chapter 529); see CAL. PROBATE CODE § 6453(a) (enacted
by Chapter 529) (re-enacting CAL. PROB. CODE § 6408(0(1)); see CAL. FAnt. CODE § 7600 (West Special
Pamphlet 1993) (stating that Part 3 of Division 12 of the California Family Code may be cited as the Uniform
Parentage Act); id. §§ 7610-7650 (West Supp. 1993) (specifying various methods for the establishment of a
parent and child relationship); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-114(a) (West 1991) (providing that the relationship of
parent and child may be established between a child and his natural parents for purposes of intestate succession
by, through, and from that child according to the procedures established in the Uniform Parentage Act).
8. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6453(b)(l)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 529); see CAL. PROBATE CODE §6453(b)(l)-
(2) (enacted by Chapter 529) (re-enacting CAL PROBATE CODE § 6408(f)(2)(a)-(b)); see also Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989) (applying the rational relationship test and upholding as constitutional, and
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Chapter 529 authorizes the use of any clear and convincing evidence to
establish paternity if it was not possible for the father to openly hold the
child out as his own.9  CJK
not in violation of a child's equal protection rights, a California statute which presumed that a child born to a
married woman living with her husband to be a child of the marriage and which denied the child any opportunity
to rebut the presumption of legitimacy); cf ALA. CODE § 43-8-48(2)(a) to (b) (1991) (providing that a person
born out of wedlock can inherit through the natural father if: (1) The natural parents have participated in a
marriage ceremony either before or after the birth of the child; (2) there is an adjudication of paternity before
the death of the father; or (3) paternity is established by clear and convincing proof after the death of the father);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108(2) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that a father and child relationship can be
established for a child born out of wedlock if: (1) The natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony either
before or after the birth of the child; (2) there is an adjudication of paternity before the death of the father; or
(3) paternity is acknowledged in writing by the father); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-208 (1991)
(providing for a father and child relationship to be established for a child born to parents who have not
participated in a marriage ceremony by: (1) A judicial proceeding; (2) a written acknowledgment by the father;
(3) the father openly and notoriously recognizing the child as his own; or (4) a subsequent marriage to the
mother and oral or written acknowledgement that the child is his); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-124(1) (1993)
(providing that, except in situations of adoption, a parent and child relationship may be established according
to the provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney Supp.
1993) (providing that a non-marital child may inherit through a natural father if: (1) An order of filiation
declaring paternity is obtained during the lifetime of the father; (2) the father signed an acknowledgement which
is filed with the putative father registry; (3) the father openly and notoriously acknowledged the child as his own
and paternity is established by clear and convincing evidence; or (4) proof of paternity by a blood genetic marker
test, in addition to other evidence which establishes paternity by clear and convincing evidence); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 84 § 215 (West 1990) (providing that a child born out of wedlock stands in the same position as a
child born in wedlock if: (1) The father acknowledged the child as his own in a signed and witnessed writing;
(2) the father and mother subsequently marry; (3) the father publicly acknowledges the child as his own and,
with the consent of his wife, accepts the child into his family as if it were a child born in wedlock; or (4)
paternity is established in a judicial proceeding); St-.,. ex. reL Daniels v. Daniels, 817 P.2d 632, 634 (Colo. App.
1991) (stating the Uniform Parentage Act favors the strong presumption of legitimacy, one of the strongest
presumptions available at common law, to a child born in wedlock); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-109(2) (alternate)
(West 1977) (providing that a father and child relationship may be established for purposes of intestate
succession from and through the father if: (1) The parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after
the birth of the child; or (2) there is an adjudication of paternity either before or after the father's death).
9. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6453(b)(3) (enacted by Chapter 529); see SENATE COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY,
BACKGROUND INFORMATION OF AB 1137, at 2-3 (1993) (alleging 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 163, sec. 132, at
661, which amended California Probate Code § 6408, was unconstitutional where the father did not have the
opportunity to hold the child out as his own or the mother did not have the opportunity to obtain a court order,
as in Kern County Superior Court Case no. 216536 (father was paralyzed and in traction when the illegitimate
child was born, and then died 28 days later) or Los Angeles County Superior Court Case no. KC008351,
consolidated with Case no. KC007473 (father died before the illegitimate child was born)); cf. MINN. STAT. §
257.62 (1992) (authorizing limited use of blood tests on relatives of decedents to establish paternity); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS § 4-1.2(a)(2)(D) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (permitting genetic marker testing to establish
paternity for a non-marital child); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 464 (1988) (holding that a six-year statute of
limitations for paternity actions violated the Equal Protection Clause because the statutory classification of
illegitimate children was not substantially related to an important government objective); Reed v. Campbell, 476
U.S. 852, 854-55 (1986) (stating that although a state's interest in the orderly disposition of decedent's estates
may justify special requirements to establish the fights of illegitimate children to inherit from their fathers, a state
cannot attempt to justify discriminatory treatment in order to express its disapproval of their parent's misconduct
and, therefore, a statute which prohibited an illegitimate child from inheriting from its father, unless the child's
parents had subsequently married, is unconstitutional), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1031 (1986); Lalli v. Lalli, 439
U.S. 259, 271-72 (1978) (upholding a statute which required an order of filiation declaring paternity during the
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Probate Code § 1419.5 (new); §§ 2105, 2250, 3611 (amended).
father's lifetime in order for illegitimate children to inherit from their fathers because the proof requirement was
substantially related to the state's interest in protecting against fraudulent claims and with the just and orderly
disposition of property at death); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977) (applying the Equal Protection
Clause to hold unconstitutional a statute which allowed children born out of wedlock to inherit from their
mothers, but denied the children the ability to inherit from their fathers unless legitimated by their subsequent
marriage on the grounds that it excludes categories of illegitimate children unnecessarily); Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (recognizing the problems with respect to proof of paternity, but holding that the Equal
Protection Clause requires that a state may not create an impenetrable barrier that invidiously discriminates
against illegitimate children by denying them substantial rights conferred upon children in general, such as: tile
right to support); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause requires that posthumously born illegitimate children not be excluded from the workers
compensation benefits of a deceased parent); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1971) (upholding against
an equal protection challenge a statute which denied an illegitimate child a share of his father's estate based
upon the following grounds: (1) The father could have legitimated the child or executed a will; and (2) such
relationships are illicit and beyond recognition of the law), reh'g denied, 402 U.S. 990 (1971); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires that a state right of action
for wrongful death in favor of legitimate children must also be conferred upon illegitimate children); Le Fevre
v. Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 1402, 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that California Probate Code § 6408, repealed
by Chapter 529, does not violate equal protection or due process rights of illegitimate children whose putative
fathers are deceased): Hullum v. Sullivan, 762 F. Supp. 1324, 1331 (N.D. IIl. 1991) (stating that the statute
requiring an adjudication of paternity before the death of the father to permit a child born out of wedlock to an
intestate share does not violate the Constitution, even though it may produce a distressing result); Estate of
Scharenbroch, 477 N.W.2d 436,438 (Mich. App. 1991) (holding that a child born out of wedlock did not have
a right to an intestate share from her father, even though it was impossible to comply with the statute
establishing paternity via a mutually acknowledged relationship as the father had died 32 days after the birth
of the child). But see In re Estate of Sanders, 2 Cal. App. 4th 462,477, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536, 545 (1992) (holding
that a trial court does not have the authority to order DNA tests to establish paternity for purposes of intestate
succession); In re Estate of Breedlove, 586 So. 2d 466, 467 (Fla. App. 1991) (requiring clear and convincing
evidence to establish paternity of a child born out of wedlock after the death of the father); Taxiera v. Malkus,
578 A.2d 761, 766 (Md. App. 1990) (holding that the paternity statute did not evidence an intent by the
Legislature to deny posthumous children the ability to establish paternity and requiring proof of paternity by a
preponderance of the evidence); Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310, 1311 (Ohio Misc. 1988) (ordering
the decedent's remains exhumed to allow paternity to be established by a DNA test); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-
109(2)(ii) (alternate) (West 1977) (requiring clear and convincing proof to establish the relationship of father
and child if the relationship is established in an adjudication after the death of the father). See generall'y Hutton
Brown, Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 668-72
(1986) (discussing the rights of children and intestate inheritance); Leslie S. Haswell, Constitutional Law:
Illegitimate's Intestate Succession and Equal Protection's Intermediate Standard, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 644, 655-
57 (1979) (discussing the intermediate standard as applied to intestate succession by children born out of
wedlock in Lalli); Catherine Pratt, Constitutional Law: Order of Filiation as Prerequisite to Illegitimnate's
Intestate hIheritance, 9 STmTsoN L. REv. 233, 238-43 (1979) (discussing an order of filiation as a prerequisite
to intestate succession by a child born out of wedlock after Lalh); Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility
of DNA Identification Evidence, 84 A.L.R. 4th 313, §§ 3, 9 (1991) (discussing the admissibility of DNA
identification evidence); Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Statutes Limiting Time for Commencemnent of Action to
Establish Paternity of Illegitimate Child as Violating Child's Constitutional Rights, 16 A.L.R. 4th 926 (1982)
(discussing the constitutionality of statutes of limitations in actions to establish paternity of illegitimate children);
Rorie Sherman, New Scrutin, For DNA Testing, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 18, 1993, at 3 (discussing how the National
Academy of Sciences will revisit its 1992 report on forensic DNA testing which raised questions concerning the
calculation of the statistical probability of DNA matches used by the FBI).
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SB 305 (Lockyer); 1993 STAT. Ch. 978
Existing law authorizes and delineates general provisions which govern
the appointment of a guardian' over a minor.2 Existing law provides that
a nomination of a guardian for a minor child may be made in a will.3
1. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1514 (West Supp. 1993) (permitting the court to appoint a guardian over
a person, estate, or both if it appears necessary or convenient); id. §§ 2351-2359 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993)
(describing the powers and duties of a guardian); id. §§ 2401-2591 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993) (describing the
powers and duties of a guardian of the estate). See generally UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 5-201-5-212 (West 1991)
(providing provisions addressing the necessity, selection, appointment, powers, duties, liabilities, duration, and
termination of a guardian of a minor).
2. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1514(a) (West Supp. 1993); see CAL. FMvI. CODE § 6500 (West Special Pamphlet
1993) (defining a minor as an individual who is under 18 years of age); CAL. PROB. CODE § 3901(k) (West
1991) (alternatively defining minor under the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act); In re Guardianship
of Marino, 30 Cal. App. 3d 952, 106 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1973) (applying the general provisions of California Civil
Code § 4600 (current version at CAL. FAm. CODE §§ 3020, 3021, 3040, 3043 (1993)) to a guardianship
proceeding and denying guardianship to the child's natural father as it would be detrimental to the child); see
also In re Medsker, 583 N.E.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (holding ineffective a written nomination
of guardianship that did not comply with the statutory requirements that such nomination be in a writing signed
by the person making the nomination in the presence of two witnesses, contain an attestation clause, and be
acknowledged before a notary public).
3. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1500 (West 1991); see id. § 1502 (West 1991) (specifying that a nomination by
will is to only become effective upon the occurrence of the stated condition); see also In re Joaquin's
Guardianship, 168 Cal. App. 2d 99, 100, 335 P.2d 507, 508 (1959) (providing that although a parent has no
power to nominate by will a general guardian without the written consent of the other, a parent has an
unqualified right to appoint a guardian of the estate that a child will take under a will); Estate of Welfer, 110
Cal. App. 2d 262, 265, 242 P.2d 655, 656 (1952) (holding that there is no compelling force on the court in
approving a testamentary appointment of a guardian); cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3046(4) (West Supp. 1993)
(stating that the court is not bound to appoint the pre-need guardian for a minor nominated by the incapacitated
or last surviving parent, but such designation creates a rebuttable presumption that the designated pre-need
guardian is entitled to serve); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-207 (West 1991) (providing that a court is duty bound to
appoint a guardian that is in the best interests of the minor); Bristol v. Brundage, 589 A.2d 1, 2 (Conn. App.
1991) (holding that a sole surviving parent's testamentary choice of a guardian creates a presumption that the
best interests of the child would be served by that appointment and the presumption can only be overcome by
showing that the appointment would be detrimental to the child); Rotter v. Rotter, 463 P.2d 928, 931 (Idaho
1970) (stating that the purpose of the statute requiring a testamentary nomination of a guardian to be approved
by the court is to allow a deceased parent some preference in the selection of a guardian while providing
protection that the appointed guardian is fit, willing, and able to act); In re Marriage of Russell, 523 N.E.2d 193,
198 (11. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that although parental intent as to who should care for a minor child is an
important factor in a guardianship proceeding, the best interests of the child are paramount, and parental wishes
must yield to this overriding concern); it re Estate of Suggs, 501 N.E.2d 307, 309-10 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that the trial court has the authority to appoint a guardian other than a testamentary nominee since the
sole responsibility of the court is to provide for the best interests and welfare of the minor); In re Guardianship
and Conservatorship of Slemp, 717 P.2d 519, 521 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a will is ineffective to
nominate a guardian or conservator unless the will has been admitted to probate); Schmidt v. Hebeisen, 347
N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that probate courts have broad powers in appointing guardians
which discretion will not be interfered with absent a clear abuse of discretion); In re Guardianship of La Velle,
230 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Neb. 1975) (holding that the testamentary appointment of a guardian will generally be
upheld unless the best interests of the child require otherwise); hI re Guardianship of Henson, 551 S.W.2d 136,
138-40 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (stating that a testamentary nomination of a guardian is entitled to be appointed
unless disqualified, but that the trial court has broad discretion in determining what is in the best interests of a
child, and the court's judgment will not be disturbed unless there is clearly an abuse of discretion); In re
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Chapter 978 authorizes the appointment of a joint guardian4 with a
custodial parent5 if the custodial parent has a defined terminal condition.6
Chapter 978 specifies that the appointment of a joint guardian with the
custodial parent will not be made over the objection of a noncustodial
parent absent a finding that the noncustodial parent's custody would be
detrimental to the minor.7
Existing law requires notification to specified individuals before
appointment of a guardian unless, for good cause, a court orders
otherwise.8 Chapter 978 decreases the age at which notification to the
Kosmicki, 468 P.2d 818, 822 ',Vyo. 1970) (holding that the court is not bound under all circumstances to
appoint a testamentary guardian since the welfare of the child is paramount). See generally L.S. Tcllier,
Annotation, Function, Power, and Discretion of Court Where There is Testamentary Appointment of Guardian
of Minor, 67 A.L.R.2d 803 (1959, Supp. 1984 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the discretion of the court where there
is a testamentary appointment of a guardian of a minor); 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Guardian and Ward § 15, at 19 (1968
& Supp. 1993) (discussing the discretion of the court to disregard a testamentary nomination of a guardian of
a minor).
4. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 2105(c)-(e) (enacted by Chapter 978) (specifying limitations on the power
that may be exercised by joint guardians).
5. See id. § 1419.5 (enacted by Chapter 978) (defining custodial parent as either a parent who has been
awarded sole custody in another proceeding or, if there is no custody order, then the parent with whom the child
resides; and providing that they will be the joint custodial parent if the child resides with both parents).
6. Id. § 2105(0 (enacted by Chapter 978); see id. (defining terminal condition as an irrevocable and
irreversible condition that is certain to result in death within two years if life-sustaining procedures are not
applied); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3046(4) (Vest Supp. 1993) (providing for the appointment of a pre-
need guardian for a minor); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 1726(3)(d)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (providing
for the appointment of a standby guardian of the person and/or property of an infant if there is significant risk
that the petitioner will become incapacitated or die within two years and the appointment is in the best interest!;
of the infant); id. § 1726(7) (providing that a standby guardian's authority which became effective pursuant to
incapacity, debilitation, or consent does not divest the petitioner of any rights, but only confers concurrent
authority with respect to the infant). See generally SENATE COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITrTEE ANALYSIS
OF SB 305, at 3 (May 18, 1993) (stating that the purpose of Chapter 978 is to provide a mechanism to allow
a custodial parent with a life threatening illness such as AIDS to obtain court approval of a guardian to take care
of a child when the parent dies or becomes incapacitated); Margaret Valentine Turano, Practice Commentaries
to N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 1726 (McKinney Supp. 1993) (stating that the enactment of New York
Surrogate's Court Procedure Act Law § 1726 was to fill an important gap resulting from the increased incidence
of AIDS and its impact on single parents); Andrew Fegelman, Mon with AIDS seeks precedent-She Would Like
a Guardian-in-Waiting for Her 2 Children, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 1993, Chicagoland Supp., at 6 (providing that
although provisions for stand-by guardians have become increasingly necessary as more parents die of AIDS,
a change in the law is also needed to protect families affected by other terminal illnesses); id. (stating that the
American Medical Association estimates that by 1995, 45,700 children will have become parentless because of
AIDS, with the number rising to 80,000 by the year 2000).
7. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2105(0 (amended by Chapter 978); see CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041 (West Special
Pamphlet 1993) (specifying that only the ultimate fact that parental custody would be detrimental to the child
shall appear in the pleadings for a motion to award custody to a non-parent; and allowing the court to exclude
the public from a hearing on the issue).
8. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2250(c) (amended by Chapter 978); see id. (requiring notice of the proposed
appointment to be personally delivered to: (I) The proposed ward if 12 years of age or older, or to the proposed
conservatee; and (2) to the parent or parents if the proposed ward is a minor).
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proposed ward is required to be given.9 Chapter 978 specifies that good
cause not to order delivery of notification may be present if the custodial
parent has died or become incapacitated and the individual seeking
appointment as guardian of the person is the nominee of the custodial
parent.'0
CJK
9. Id. § 2250(c) (amended by Chapter 978) (requiring notification to the proposed ward if 12 years of
age or older); cf 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 79, see. 14, at 101 (amending CAL. PROB. CODE. § 2250(c))
(requiring notification to the proposed ward if 14 years of age or older).
10. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2250(c) (amended by Chapter 978); see id. § 2250(d) (amended by Chapter 978)
(requiring a court to set a rehearing date for temporary guardianship when the initial temporary guardianship
proceeding is granted ex parte and the general guardianship proceeding is not scheduled to be held within the
next 30 days); id. § 2250(e) (amended by Chapter 978) (providing that visitation orders granted prior to the time
the petition for temporary guardianship was filed will remain in effect, unless the court for good cause finds
otherwise).
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